We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an ǫ-approximately optimal symmetric signaling scheme in a two-player zero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time (nΩ (lg n) ). This is tight by [6] and resolves an open question of Dughmi [10] . We also prove that finding a multiplicative approximation is NP-hard.
Introduction
Many classical questions in Economics involve extracting information from strategic agents. Recently, there has been growing interest in signaling: the study of how to reveal information to strategic agents (see e.g. [10, 6] and references therein). Signaling has been studied in many interesting economic and game theoretic settings. Among them, Symmetric Zero-Sum Signaling proposed by Dughmi [10] stands out as a canonical problem that cleanly captures the computational nature of signaling. In particular, focusing on zero-sum games trivializes issues of equilibrium selection and computational tractability of finding an equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Zero-Sum Signaling [10] ). Alice and Bob play a Bayesian zerosum game where the payoff matrix is drawn from a publicly known prior. A signaling scheme privately observes the state of nature (i.e. the payoff matrix), and then publicly broadcasts a signal to both Alice and Bob. The goal is to design an efficient signaling scheme (a function from payoff matrices to strings) that maximizes Alice's expected payoff in the induced Nash equilibrium.
Dughmi's [10] main result proves that assuming the hardness of the Planted Clique problem, there is no additive FPTAS for Symmetric Zero-Sum Signaling. The main open question left by [10] is whether there exists an additive PTAS. Here we answer this question on the negative: we prove that assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) [11] , obtaining an additive-ǫ-approximation (for some constant ǫ > 0) requires quasi-polynomial time (nΩ (lg n) ). This result is tight thanks to a recent quasi-polynomial algorithm by Cheng et al. [6] . Another important advantage of our result is that it replaces the hardness of Planted Clique with a more believable worst-case hardness assumption (see e.g. the discussion in [5] ).
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is somewhat non-standard (but not unprecedented [7] ) in multiplicative approximation. However, we note that the purpose of negative and positive payoffs is only to obtain structural constraints on the resulting equilibria; the hardness of approximation is not a result of cancellation of negative with positive payoffs: Alice's payoff can be decomposed as a difference of non-negative payoffs U = U + − U − , such that it is hard to approximate Alice's optimal payoff to within ǫ · E [U + + U − ]. Nevertheless, we believe that extending this result to non-negative payoffs could be very interesting.
Finally, we note that since all our games are zero-sum, our hardness results carry over to the respective notions of additive-and multiplicative-ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Techniques
Our main ingredient for the quasi-polynomial hardness is the technique of "birthday repetition" coined by [1] and recently applied in game theoretic settings in [5, 3] : We reduce from a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) over n variables to a distribution over N zero-sum N ×N games, with N = 2 Θ( √ n) . Alice and Bob's strategies correspond to assignments to tuples of √ n variables. By the birthday paradox, the two √ n-tuples chosen by Alice and Bob share a constraint with constant probability. If a constant fraction of the constraints are unsatisfiable, Alice's payoff will suffer with constant probability. Assuming ETH, approximating the value of the CSP requires time 2Ω (n) = NΩ (lg N ) .
The challenge The main difficulty is that once the signal is public, the zero-sum game is tractable. Thus we would like to force the signaling scheme to output a satisfying assignment. Furthermore, if the scheme would output partial assignments on different states of nature, it is not clear how to check consistency between different signals. Thus we would like each signal to contain an entire satisfying assignment. The optimal scheme may be very complicated and even require randomization, yet by an application of the Caratheodory Theorem the number of signals is, wlog, bounded by the number of states of nature [10] . If the state of nature can be described using only lg N =Θ ( √ n) bits, how can we force the scheme to output an entire assignment?
To overcome this obstacle, we let the state of nature contain a partial assignment to a random √ n-tuple of variables. We then check the consistency of Alice's assignment with nature's assignment, Bob's assignment with nature's assignment, and Alice and Bob's assignments with each other; let τ A,Z , τ B,Z , τ A,B denote the outcomes of those consistency checks, respectively. Alice's payoff is given by:
for some small constant 0 < δ < 1. Now, both Alice and Bob want to maximize their chances of being consistent with nature's partial assignment, and the signaling scheme gains by maximizing τ A,B . Of course, if nature outputs a random assignment, we have no reason to expect that it can be completed to a full satisfying assignment. Instead, the state of nature consists of N assignments, and the signaling scheme helps Alice and Bob play with the assignment that can be completed.
Several other obstacles arise; fortunately some can be handled using techniques from previous works on hardness of finding Nash equilibrium [2, 8, 3] .
Preliminaries

PCP Theorem
Theorem 1 (PCP Theorem [9] ; see e.g. [4, Theorem 2.11] for this formulation). Given a 3SAT instance ϕ of size n, there is a polynomial time reduction that produces a 2CSP instance ψ, with size |ψ| = n · polylogn variables and constraints, and constant alphabet size, such that:
Completeness If ϕ is satisfiable, then so is ψ.
Soundness If ϕ is not satisfiable, then at most a (1 − η)-fraction of the constraints in ψ can be satisfied, for some η = Ω (1).
Balance Every variable in ψ participates in exactly d = O (1) constraints.
Finding a good partition
Proof. We assign vertices to subsets iteratively, and show by induction that we can always maintain (1) and the bound on the subset size. Since the average set size is less than k, we have by Markov's inequality that at each step less than half of the subsets are full. The next vertex we want to assign, v, has neighbors in at most d subsets. By our induction hypothesis, each S i is of size at most 2k, so in expectation over j ∈ [n], it has less than 4dk 2 /n neighbors in each S j . Applying Markov's inequality again, S i has at least 8d 2 k 2 /n neighbors in less than a (1/2d)-fraction of subsets S j . In total, we ruled out less than half of the subsets for being full, and less than half of the subsets for having too many neighbors with subsets that contain neighbors of v. Therefore there always exists some subset S i to which we can add v while maintaining the induction hypothesis.
How to catch a far-from-uniform distribution Lemma 2 (Lemma 3 in the full version of [8] ). Let {a i } n i=1 be real numbers satisfying the following properties for some θ > 0:
Additive hardness
Theorem 2. There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that assuming ETH, approximating Symmetric Zero-Sum Signaling with payoffs in [−1, 1] to within an additive ǫ requires time nΩ (lg n) .
Construction overview
Our reduction begins with a 2CSP ψ over n variables from alphabet Σ. We partition the variables into n/k disjoint subsets S 1 , . . . , S n/k , each of size at most 2k for k = √ n such that every two subsets share at most a constant number of constraints.
Nature chooses a random subset S i from the partition, a random assignment u ∈ Σ 2k to the variables in S i , and an auxiliary vectorb ∈ {0, 1} Σ× [2k] . As mentioned in Section 1.1, u may not correspond to any satisfying assignment. Alice and Bob participate in one of |Σ| 2k subgames; for each v ∈ Σ 2k , there is a corresponding subgame where all the assignments are XOR-ed with v. The optimum signaling scheme reveals partial information aboutb in a way that guides Alice and Bob to participate in the subgame where the XOR of v and u can be completed to a full satisfying assignment. The scheme also outputs the full satisfying assignment, but reveals no information about the subset S i chosen by nature. Each player has
√ n) strategies. The first |Σ| 2k strategies correspond to a Σ-ary vector v that the scheme will choose after observing the random input. The signaling scheme forces both players to play (w.h.p.) the strategy corresponding to v by controlling the information that corresponds to the next 2 strategies. Namely, for each v ′ ∈ Σ 2k , there is a random bit b ( v ′ ) such that each player receives a payoff of 1 if they play
. The b's are part of the state of nature, and the signaling scheme will reveal only the bit corresponding to the special v. Since there are |Σ| 2k bits, nature cannot choose them independently, as that would require 2 |Σ| 2k states of nature. Instead we construct a pairwise independent distribution. The next n/k strategies correspond to the choice of a subset S i from the specified partition of variables. The n/k n/2k strategies that follow correspond to a gadget due to Althofer [2] whereby each player forces the other player to randomize (approximately) uniformly over the choice of subset.
The last |Σ| 2k strategies correspond to an assignment to S i . The assignment to each S i is XOR-ed entry-wise with v. Then, the players are paid according to checks of consistency between their assignments, and a random assignment to a random S i picked by nature.
(The scheme chooses v so that nature's random assignment is part of a globally satisfying assignment.) Each player wants to pick an assignment that passes the consistency check with nature's assignment. Alice also receives a small bonus if her assignment agrees with Bob's; thus her payoff is maximized when there exists a globally satisfying assignment.
Formal construction
Let ψ be a 2CSP-d over n variables from alphabet Σ, as guaranteed by Theorem 1. In particular, ETH implies that distinguishing between a completely satisfiable instance and (1 − η)-satisfiable requires time 2Ω (n) . By Lemma 1, we can (deterministically and efficiently) partition the variables into n/k subsets S 1 , . . . , S n/k of size at most 2k = 2 √ n, such that every two subsets share at most 8d 2 k 2 /n = O (1) constraints.
States of nature Nature chooses a state
is the XOR of bits fromb that correspond to entries of v:
Notice that the b ( v)'s are pairwise independent and each marginal distribution is uniform over {0, 1}.
Strategies Alice and Bob each choose a strategy
× Σ 2k . We use v A , c A , etc. to denote the strategy Alice plays, and similarly v B , c B , etc.
for Bob. For σ, σ ′ ∈ Σ, we denote σ ⊕ Σ σ ′ σ + σ ′ (mod |Σ|), and for vectors v, v ′ ∈ Σ 2k , we let v⊕ Σ v ′ ∈ Σ 2k denote the entry-wise 
where
and
for a sufficiently small constant 0 < δ ≪ √ η.
Completeness
Lemma 3. If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a signaling scheme and a mixed strategy for Alice that guarantees expected payoff δ − δ 2 + δ 3 .
Proof. Fix a satisfying assignment α ∈ Σ n . Given state of nature b , i, u , let v be such that Bob's goal is thus to maximize δ 2 τ B,Z − δ 3 τ A,B . However, since Alice's assignment and nature's assignment are drawn from the same distribution, we have that for any mixed strategy that Bob plays, E τ B,Z = E τ A,B . Therefore Alice's payoff is at least
Soundness Lemma 4.
If at most a (1 − η)-fraction of the constraints are satisfiable, Alice's maxmin payoff is at most δ − δ 2 + (1 − Ω (1)) δ 3 , for any signaling scheme.
Proof. On any signal, Bob chooses v B , c B from the same distribution that Alice uses for v A , c A . He chooses j B uniformly, and picks T B so as to minimize E U A Althofer . Finally, for each j B , he draws w B from the same marginal distribution that Alice uses for w A conditioning on j A = j B (and uniformly at random if Alice never plays j A = j B ). By symmetry, E U A b = 0 and E U A Althofer ≤ 0. In Althofer's gadget, Alice can guarantee an (optimal) expected payoff of 0 by randomizing uniformly over her choice of j A and T A . On the converse, by Lemma 2, if Alice's marginal distribution over the choice of j A is 8δ 2 -far from uniform (in total variation distance), then
ψ . So henceforth we assume wlog that Alice's marginal distribution over the choice of j A is O δ 2 -close to uniform.
Since Alice's marginal distribution over j A is O δ 2 -close to uniform, we have that Bob's distribution over j B , w B is O δ 2 -close to Alice's distribution over j A , w A . Therefore τ B,Z ≥ τ A,Z − O δ 2 , and so we also get:
It remains to upper bound τ A,B . By the premise, any assignment to all variables violates at least an η-fraction of the constraints. In particular, this is true in expectation for assignments drawn according to Bob's mixed strategy. Since every pair of subsets shares at most a constant number of constraints, an Ω (η)-fraction of the pairs of assignments chosen by Alice and Bob would violate ψ. Therefore, since Alice's distribution over j A is O δ 2 -close to uniform, we have τ A,B ≤ 1 − Ω (η) + O δ 2 . Plugging into (2) completes the proof.
Multiplicative hardness
Theorem 3. There exists a constant ǫ > 0, such that it is NP-hard to approximate Symmetric Zero-Sum Signaling to within a multiplicative (1 − ǫ) factor.
Construction overview
Our reduction begins with a 2CSP ψ over n variables from alphabet Σ. Nature chooses a random index i ∈ [n], a random assignment u ∈ Σ for variable x i , and an auxiliary vector b ∈ {0, 1}
Σ . Notice that u may not correspond to any satisfying assignment.
Alice and Bob participate in one of |Σ| subgames; for each v ∈ Σ, there is a corresponding subgame where all the assignments are XOR-ed with v. The optimum signaling scheme reveals partial information about b in a way that guides Alice and Bob to participate in the subgame where the XOR of v and u can be completed to a full satisfying assignment. The scheme also outputs the full satisfying assignment, but reveals no information about the index i chosen by nature. Alice has (|Σ| × 2) × (n × n × |Σ|) = Θ n 2 strategies, and Bob has an additional choice among n strategies (so Θ n 3 in total). The first |Σ| strategies correspond to a value v ∈ Σ that the scheme will choose after observing the state of nature. The signaling scheme forces both players to play (w.h.p.) the strategy corresponding to v by controlling the information that corresponds to the next 2 strategies. Namely, for each v ′ ∈ Σ, there is a random bit b (v ′ ) such that each player receives a small bonus if they play
The b's are part of the state of nature, and the signaling scheme will reveal only the bit corresponding to the special v.
The next n strategies correspond to a choice of a variable j ∈ [n]. The n strategies that follow correspond to a hide-and-seek gadget whereby each player forces the other player to randomize (approximately) uniformly over the choice of j. For Bob, the additional n strategies induce a hide-and-seek game against nature, which serves to verify that the scheme does not reveal too much information about the state of nature (this extra verification was unnecessary in the reduction for additive inapproximability).
The last |Σ| strategies induce an assignment for x j . The assignment to each x j is XOR-ed with v. Then, the players are paid according to checks of consistency between their assignments, and a random assignment to a random x i picked by nature. (The scheme chooses v so that nature's random assignment is part of a globally satisfying assignment.) Each player wants to pick an assignment that passes the consistency check with nature's assignment. Alice also receives a small bonus if her assignment agrees with Bob's; thus her payoff is maximized when there exists a globally satisfying assignment.
Formal construction
Let ψ be a 2CSP-d over n variables from alphabet Σ, as guaranteed by Theorem 1. In particular, it is NP-hard to distinguish between ψ which is completely satisfiable, and one where at most a (1 − η)-fraction of the constraints can be satisfied. We denote (i, j) ∈ ψ if there is a constraint over variables (x i , x j ).
States of nature Nature chooses a state b, i, u ∈ {0, 1} Σ × [n] × Σ uniformly at random.
Strategies Alice chooses a strategy v
, and for a vector α ∈ Σ n we let (σ ⊕ Σ α) ∈ Σ n denote the ⊕ Σ of σ with each entry of α. 
Completeness
Lemma 5. If ψ is satisfiable, there exists a signaling scheme and a mixed strategy for Alice that guarantees expected payoff
Proof. Fix a satisfying assignment α ∈ Σ n . Given state of nature b , i, u , let v be such that 
We can assume wlog that Pr i, j A ∈ ψ ≤ 3d/n. Otherwise, Bob can drawĵ A from the same marginal distribution that Alice uses for j A , and set q B to a random ψ-neighbor ofĵ A . This would imply Pr i = q B ≥ Pr i, j A ∈ ψ /d, and therefore
in which case E U A ≤ 0. Therefore by (3), E U A ψ ≤ 4dδ 3 /n. Furthermore, we claim that Alice's optimal marginal distribution over the choice of j A is O δ 3 -close to uniform (in total variation distance). Suppose by contradiction that the distribution is 8dδ 3 -far from uniform. Then there exists some ℓ ∈ [n] such that Pr j A = ℓ ≥ 1 + 4dδ 3 /n. If Bob always plays t B = ℓ, then E U A seek ≤ −4dδ 3 /n, and E U A ≤ 0. Since Alice's distribution over j A is O δ 3 -close to uniform, we have that Bob's distribution over j B , w B is O δ 3 -close to Alice's distribution over j A , w A . Therefore, τ B,Z ≥ τ A,Z − O δ 3 , so
